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Abstract 
In the last two decades, airline alliances were not only successful in extending the size of their 
networks, but also received approvals by public authorities to intensify their cooperation through 
to merger-like revenue-sharing joint ventures (JVs). We empirically investigate the impact of the 
implementation of such joint ventures on both the respective airlines’ competitive strategies as 
well as productive efficiency. Using U.S. DOT T100 International Segment data and applying 
airline-market fixed effects models, we find that joint ventures – compared to services with a 
lower degree of cooperation – lead to a 3-5 percent increase in capacity between the respective 
partner airlines’ hub airports; however, this is done at the expense of services elsewhere in the 
network. Productive efficiency, as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower 
for joint venture routes compared to routes operated under antitrust immunity only. We use our 
empirical results to discuss implications for the balancing of competition and cooperation in 
transatlantic airline markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Economists and philosophers have studied the benefits of competition in a multitude of ways. 
Notwithstanding the potential relevance of any of these efforts – some of which having been 
very influential, such as Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ or Friedrich August von Hayek’s 
‘competition as a discovery procedure’ – the most fundamental result of all these research efforts 
is probably the insight that competitive markets allocate resources efficiently because they 
provide products to all customers willing to pay the opportunity cost of production. Abstracting 
from possible market imperfections or failures, a society’s welfare is therefore maximized by 
securing open and competitive markets.  
Although competition certainly is a key driver of the wealth of nations, it is equally undisputed 
that cooperation between firms has the potential to drive substantial increases in economic 
welfare. For example, the pooling of (partly) complementary resources as part of research and 
development activities can not only reduce the fixed cost burden to society, but might also lead 
to quicker and/or better research outputs and (subsequently) improved products and services. 
However, although cooperation between firms can surely increase welfare, researchers have also 
identified forms of firm cooperation (e.g., price fixing or market sharing arrangements) that are 
likely to lead to detrimental welfare effects.  
The existence of both costs and benefits of firm cooperation immediately suggests the question 
of the optimal degree of cooperation to maximize economic welfare. The transatlantic airline 
market renders itself very well to such an investigation. Cooperation between the airlines on this 
market has been in place for over two decades, and it has taken various forms. At this time, 
partnerships on transatlantic routes range from ad hoc codesharing agreements via partnerships 
covered by antitrust immunity through to revenue-sharing merger-like joint ventures (JVs). 
Airline joint ventures are a recent phenomenon, and effects of this new form of airline 
cooperation has not received any attention in the academic literature. 
Against this background, we empirically investigate the impact of the implementation of airline 
revenue-sharing joint ventures (JVs) on both the respective airlines’ competitive strategies as 
well as productive efficiency. Using U.S. DOT T100 International Segment data and applying 
airline-market fixed effects models, we find that joint ventures – compared to services with a 
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lower degree of cooperation – lead to an increase in capacity between the respective partner 
airlines’ hub airports of 3-5 percent; however, at the expense of services elsewhere in the 
network. Productive efficiency, as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower 
for joint venture routes compared to routes operated under antitrust immunity only. We use our 
empirical results to discuss implications for the balancing of competition and cooperation in 
transatlantic airline markets.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general high-level 
description of the balancing of competition and cooperation in joint ventures. The subsequent 
Section 3 applies the general theories and concepts to the case of airline alliances. After a general 
introduction to the development of airline alliances in Section 3.1, Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the general economic effects of such agreements as discussed in the existing 
literature. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. While Section 4.1 provides a detailed 
description of the construction of the data set and the descriptive statistics, Section 4.2 continues 
with the characterization of our methodological approach. Section 4.3 closes the section with the 
presentation and discussion of our empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2 Balancing competition and cooperation in joint ventures 
The general question of balancing competition and cooperation is closely connected to the 
determinants of firm boundaries, discussed extensively in the economics and business strategy 
literature over the last couple of decades. Differentiating between horizontal and vertical 
boundaries of the firm, cost considerations are typically presumed to be one important 
determinant of the former. With respect to the vertical boundaries, theoretical and empirical 
research has demonstrated the importance of the balance between investment incentives (specific 
assets) and performance incentives (Cabral, 2000). These incentives determine the efficient 
degree of cooperation; that is, the degree which minimizes the sum of production and transaction 
cost. 
In addition to the two polar options of ‘market’ and ‘integration’, several hybrid organizational 
forms have emerged to reach the desired efficient solution for organizing economic activities 
(see Bilotkach and Hüschelrath, 2011 for a general discussion). Strategic alliances and joint 
ventures (JVs) can be interpreted as two available options for the optimization of a firm’s 
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horizontal and vertical organizational structure. Let us focus on joint ventures1 for the time being. 
They generally occur when two or more firms pool some of their resources within a common 
legal organization (Kogut, 1988). The theoretical rationales for forming joint ventures rather than 
entering into regular contracts include transaction costs savings, strategic behavior, and 
capitalizing on the organizational knowledge. The former of the three is well in line with the 
traditional Stiglerian boundaries of the firm argument; the second relates to longer-term profit 
maximization; and the latter views joint ventures as a means by which the firms learn or retain 
their capabilities (Kogut, 1988). Some researchers also noted that the alliance structure can be 
determined by the social networks within which the firm is embedded (Gulati, 1998). 
Shapiro and Willig (1990) point to the following potential benefits of joint ventures. First, joint 
ventures can be a mechanism for effective risk sharing in an uncertain environment. Second, they 
help the firms realize cost savings due to either the complementary nature of their products or 
economies of scale and scope. Furthermore, Barney (2002) reminds that joint ventures can be 
used as a vehicle to facilitate tacit collusion among the partner firms (in related markets), thereby 
increasing market power and profits. Additionally, joint ventures can help the firms to enter new 
markets, industries, or industry segments.  
Empirical analysis of joint ventures in the economics and management literature mostly deals 
with evaluation of the realization of such benefits. For instance, Chan et al. (1997) and Koh and 
Venkatraman (1991) find a positive effect of alliances and joint ventures on stock prices. 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) and Kotabe and Swan (1995) examine new product development 
facilitated by alliances. 
However, the potential benefits of such agreements have to be traded off against the potential 
costs. For example, when partners’ goals differ, joint ventures may exacerbate the situation and 
hurt rather than help the parties involved. Also, Shapiro and Willig (1990) point to the potential 
for free riding by the venture partners as another possible problem associated with joint ventures. 
                                                            
1  The business strategy literature does not provide a clear definition and delineation of strategic alliances and joint 
ventures. Barney (2002), for example, subdivides ‘strategic alliances’ into non-equity alliances, equity alliances, 
and joint ventures. The key difference between the latter and the former two is that only a joint venture leads to 
the creation of a legally independent new corporation in which the parent companies hold shares. Following this 
delineation, airline alliances must typically be categorized as ‘non-equity alliances’ rather than ‘joint ventures’. 
However, in the remainder of this paper we follow the majority of the literature and use the term ‘joint venture’ 
for (revenue-sharing) airline alliances. In fact, both terms can be considered interchangeable, as both 
organizational forms are similar in their motivations and economic effects.  
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Furthermore, Walker (2004) identifies reduced control over decision making, strategic 
inflexibility, weaker organizational identity of the participating companies, and potential 
conflicts with antitrust law as additional disadvantages of cooperation among firms in general 
and joint ventures in particular. In fact, existing antitrust laws must be considered as key 
potential constraint of cooperation in transatlantic airline market as it will be shown in the 
following section.  
3 Competition and cooperation in transatlantic airline markets 
3.1 The development of airline alliances 
Generally, the airline industry – defined here as commercial scheduled passenger transportation 
– deals with moving people and their luggage from point A to point B. The production process is 
rather complex and involves many aspects such as ticketing, luggage handling, passenger 
catering, fueling, air traffic control, and aircraft maintenance. The airlines differ in many ways, 
from pricing policies, over the fleet mix to the degree to which they choose to vertically integrate 
the various parts of the production process. Yet, there is one thing in common for all the carriers: 
no single airline’s network encompasses all possible “point A to point B” combinations. This 
fact forces many passengers to ‘interline’ or change an airline during their journey. 
Given these specifics of air transport, the early forms of cooperation between airlines on 
deregulated markets have appeared as a way to tackle this interlining problem more efficiently, 
making the ‘joint’ product more attractive to the customer as compared to other possible 
interlining options. At the perhaps most primitive level, the passenger would be more attracted to 
an interline service – other things equal and assuming no on-line service is available – which 
allows him/her to check the luggage through to the final destination, thus not having to worry 
about the checked bags beyond the customs requirements. The web of interlining agreements 
gradually gave rise to international airline alliances, even though numerous inter-alliance and 
out-of-alliance ad hoc partnerships to facilitate interline travel still exist. The three global 
alliances – SkyTeam, Star, and oneworld – currently carry about 75 percent of all passengers on 
the global market. 
An advanced form of cooperation among airlines is called codesharing. Codesharing refers to 
including an airline’s flights into the partner airlines’ schedules. Thus, an airline via a 
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codesharing arrangement is able to enlarge its network without having to service additional 
flights. Moreover, it can sell tickets for the interline flight as its own. The early forms of airline 
alliances in the late 1990s were guided by the codesharing principle, often complemented by 
agreements to jointly use airport facilities (e.g., gates). Additionally, sharing of customer loyalty 
(i.e., frequent flier) programs was very common (see generally Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011, 
2012) for detailed discussions).  
A further degree of cooperation is reached if the alliance partners enter into some form of joint 
price setting arrangements that typically also imply a joint coordination of scheduling (i.e. 
departure times and flight frequencies). Given the price fixing nature of such agreements, 
antitrust laws typically prohibit the implementation of this kind of joint venture. Granting of 
antitrust immunity is therefore a precondition for an implementation of such agreements. 
Limiting ourselves to U.S. enforcement actions with respect to transatlantic airline alliances, the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) as responsible public authority eventually approved – 
referring to the transatlantic market only – a total of 13 applications from core members of 
SkyTeam (from 19952 to 20013) and Star alliances (from 19964 to 20055). However, applications 
of the core oneworld alliance members – American Airlines and British Airways – in 19976 and 
20017 were unsuccessful due to the dominant role of both airlines at London’s Heathrow airport.  
The most complete form of cooperation allowed under the current regulatory constraints is the 
establishment of a merger-like revenue-sharing joint venture. As part of such an agreement, the 
partner airlines are pooling revenues and costs of their operations thereby leading to a merger-
like cooperation, in which the partners are indifferent as to which of them is actually carrying a 
particular passenger (so-called ‘metal neutrality’). The first attempt to receive approval for such 
an extensive agreement was undertaken by the core SkyTeam (Delta-Air France) and Wings 
(Northwest-KLM) partnerships in 2004 8 . Based on fears that the close cooperation on 
international markets might have spillover effects on domestic competition, the DOT first denied 
                                                            
2  DOT-OST-1995-618 (Delta, Swissair, Sabena, Austrian). 
3  DOT-OST-2001-10429 (Delta, Air France, Alitalia, Czech). 
4  DOT-OST-1996-1116 (United, Lufthansa). 
5  DOT-OST-2005-22922 (United, Austrian, bmi, LOT, Lufthansa, SAS, Swiss, TAP). 
6  DOT-OST-1997-2058 (American, British Airways). 
7  DOT-OST-2001-10387 (American, British Airways). 
8  DOT-OST-2004-19214 (Delta, Northwest, Air France, KLM, Alitalia, Czech). 
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approval for the enlarged SkyTeam alliance.9 Anticipating introduction of the U.S.-EU Open 
Aviation Area agreement and promoting the concept of metal-neutrality (which refers to the 
practice of revenue and cost pooling within the alliance), SkyTeam reapplied in 200710 and the 
DOT decided in May 200811 to approve the application as “… the proposed alliance is consistent 
with the public interest, will produce public benefits, and will not substantially reduce 
competition”. Subsequently, in July 200912 and July 201013, the core members of Star and 
oneworld alliances were given approval to implement their respective revenue-sharing joint 
venture agreements. However, all approvals were subject to certain approval conditions (partly) 
including carve-outs (see Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011) for a detailed discussion).  
Before we turn to a discussion of the economic effects of airline alliances in general and 
revenue-sharing joint ventures in particular, the identified existence of several degrees of airline 
cooperation raises the question of their relevance in practice. Figure 1 therefore provides the 
passenger-based shares of the three major route categories – no immunity, immunity without JV 
and JV – on the transatlantic market between 2007 and 2013. 
 
                                                            
9  DOT-OST-2004-19214 (Final Order), Order 2006-2-1 (Feb. 6, 2006). Other reasons to deny the initial request 
for antitrust immunity were the potential reduction of competitive pressures in gateway-to-gateway markets and 
the foreclosure of competitor’s access to alliance hubs.  
10  DOT-OST-2007-28644 (Delta, Northwest, Air France, KLM, Alitalia, Czech). 
11  DOT-OST-2007-28644 (Final Order), Order 2008-5-32 (May 22, 2008). 
12  DOT-OST-2008-0234 (United, Austrian, bmi, LOT, Lufthansa, SAS, Swiss, TAP, Air Canada, Brussels, 
Continental). 
13  DOT-OST-2008-0252 (American, British Airways, Iberia, Finnair). 
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Figure 1: Passenger-based shares of different route categories 
Source: own calculations based on DOT T100 data 
As shown by Figure 1, the share of passengers traveling on JV routes increased dramatically 
from zero percent in 2007 to about 78 percent in 2011 mirroring the granting of transatlantic JVs 
in 2008 to SkyTeam, 2009 to Star and 2010 to oneworld. The share of immunity routes outside 
of JVs decreased accordingly from about 56 percent in 2007 to less than 10 percent in 2013. A 
comparable but less pronounced trend is found for routes on which neither immunity nor a joint 
venture form of cooperation was implemented. The share decreased from about 44 percent in 
2007 to about 26 percent in 2010 to a rather stable share of about 15 percent since 2011. 
3.2 Economic effects of airline alliances 
A number of studies, both theoretical and empirical, evaluate the economic effects of 
international airline partnerships (see generally Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011, 2013)). 
Theoretical models of international airline consolidation include studies by Oum, Park and 
Zhang (1996), Park (1997), Brueckner (2001), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Heimer and Shy 
(2006), Bilotkach (2005, 2007a, 2007b), Barla and Constantatos (2006), Chen and Gayle (2007) 
and Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007). Most of these studies analyze motives for and 
effects of a single airline alliance, outside of the broader context.14 Of the above cited papers, the 
                                                            
14  Despite the various modeling approaches of airline alliances in recent years, most attempts in the literature 
frequently fail to differentiate between joint ventures and mergers between airlines. Alliances are also often 
found to be profitable for individual airlines. Sometimes such a conclusion comes with caveats: e.g., Bilotkach 
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issue of competition between alliances is considered by Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Bilotkach 
(2005), and Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007). The general conclusion from those 
studies is that airline consolidation benefits interline passengers due to the complementary nature 
of the product and the removal of double marginalization. However, as soon as consolidation 
decreases competition, consumers may lose depending on the relative sizes of the cost-saving 
effect and the market power effect.  
Generally, the size of the cost-saving effect is influenced to a great extent by the realized benefits 
of higher traffic due to cooperation between airlines reflected in the so-called economies of 
traffic density15 (i.e. falling average cost with higher load factors). Furthermore, airline alliances 
are expected to realize further alliance-specific efficiencies due to cost reductions via shared 
back office functions, maintenance facilities and operational staff as well as joint marketing 
advantages of the integrated frequent flyer programs. These incremental advantages for 
consumers need to be traded off against the market power effect of airline consolidation. This 
effect is basically driven by the possibility that airline alliances might eliminate horizontal intra-
alliance competition, thereby causing higher fares and a reduced choice on certain routes (see, 
e.g., Reitzes and Moss, 2008). The existence and magnitude of the market power effect is 
dependent on various competition parameters. For example, as argued by Oum et al. (2000)16 the 
degree of overlap between the respective networks is typically a key determinant because the 
higher the overlap, the more severe are the competition concerns and the more likely are price 
increases as a consequence of cooperation. Furthermore, the participating airlines may use 
alliances to reduce competitive pressures by facilitating collusive behavior or restricting entry 
through the implementation of foreclosure strategies. 
Empirical analyses of the effects of international airline alliances have been offered by Oum et al. 
(1996), Park and Zhang (2000), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003), Whalen (2007) 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(2005), as well as Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007) suggest setups where alliance formation can be an 
outcome of a Prisoners’ Dilemma type of setting, where each pair of potential partners is individually better off 
outside of an alliance, but can increase profits by forming a partnership, provided the other pair remains unallied. 
15  For instance, Brueckner and Spiller (1994), found that a 10 percent traffic increase lead to a 3.75 percent 
reduction in marginal costs. 
16  Oum et al. (2000) classify alliances into ‘complementary’ and ‘parallel’ ones. While complementary alliances – 
i.e. the networks of the alliance partners largely feed traffic to each other – are likely to reduce fares, parallel 
alliances – i.e. the networks of the alliance partners partly overlap and competition on these routes is reduced – 
are likely to increase fares. 
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and Bilotkach (2007c).17  All of these papers confirm that airline alliances benefit interline 
passengers by offering lower fares. Park and Zhang also find evidence for increasing market 
power of the alliance members at their hubs, even though they suggest that this effect is offset by 
the cost savings that the alliance brings about. While finding that alliances decrease interline 
fares, Brueckner and Whalen (2000) fail to observe a statistically significant increase in fares due 
to airline consolidation where such appears to decrease the number of competitors.  
In general, the consensus of research on the economic effects of airline alliances is that interline 
partnerships benefit consumers thanks to the removal of double marginalization and economies 
of traffic density. These benefits might partly come in the form of lower ticket prices, but might 
also include higher flight frequency, more destinations within easy reach, or shorter travel times. 
All these factors tend to have a stimulating effect on demand and traffic growth. However, what 
need to be investigated closer in the following are the relative costs and benefits of several 
degrees of cooperation between airlines. In particular, an understanding needs to be developed 
whether, first, the granting of antitrust immunity and, second, the approval of full-fledged 
revenue-sharing joint ventures, are compulsory to realize the key benefits for the consumers to 
the fullest extent, or whether lower degrees of cooperation can reach comparable benefits levels 
(while avoiding the incremental costs). Our empirical analysis in the following section will shed 
light on these important questions.  
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Construction of the data set and descriptive statistics 
Our main source of data is the T100 International Segment dataset, provided by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. This dataset is essentially a census of all non-stop commercial 
international flights performed to and from the United States. The data are aggregated at the 
month-route-operating-carrier-aircraft-type level. Each entry contains information about the 
segment’s endpoints, operating carrier, and monthly totals for the number of departures 
performed, seats offered, and passengers carried on this particular segment. This information 
                                                            
17  There is also an older set of empirical papers available which study the effects of airline alliances on airline costs, 
revenues or profits, passenger traffic, passenger fares, and convenience and service quality. However, given the 
significant changes in the degree of cooperation among airlines we omit a detailed discussion of the results here 
as they might not be that relevant for contemporary alliances (see generally Button and Drexler (2006) and 
Morrish and Hamilton (2002) for overviews).  
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naturally allows us to compute the flights’ load factors, also aggregated at the carrier-route-
month level.  
We have set up the sample for data analysis in the following way. From our main dataset, we 
have selected data for travel between the U.S. and all current EU members, plus Switzerland and 
Norway, for the years 2007 up to (and including) 2013. We have retained only passenger 
services, aggregated the data to the month-route-operating-carrier level (pooling together the data 
for services by the same airline between the same endpoints, performed on aircraft of different 
types), and removed directionality from the data (i.e., we pooled British Airways’ London 
Heathrow to New York JFK airport flights together with the same carrier’s flights in the opposite 
direction). To make sure our analysis remains focused on the market for scheduled commercial 
passenger services, we have eliminated services with fewer than thirty monthly departures18. We 
have further restricted our sample to services performed by the ‘legacy’ carriers; these include 
mostly EU countries’ traditional flag carriers19 and major U.S. airlines. In this way, we eliminate 
services by smaller and charter carriers, as well as by the airlines from other parts of the world 
(mostly Asian carriers) performing transatlantic services under the fifth freedom rights20. All 
these restrictions left us with nearly 17,000 airline-market-month level observations for 385 
airline-market combinations on 263 non-directional airport-pair markets. 
The transatlantic joint ventures have added another dimension to the transatlantic market 
structure. We have quite naturally created the corresponding JV indicator variable, tying it to the 
date of the venture’s approval, and assuming the venture became operational the month after 
such approval has been obtained. Specifically, the JV variable takes on the value of 1 for the 
following services: 
‐ Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, KLM, and Air France services after May 2008; 
‐ Lufthansa, United Airlines, and Continental Airlines services after July 2009; 
‐ American Airlines, British Airways, and Iberia services after July 2010. 
                                                            
18  Since we removed directionality, this means that we have only retained services that are operated at least as 
frequently as 3-4 times per week in every direction. 
19   Other European carriers with significant scheduled passenger services include such airlines as Virgin Atlantic, 
Air Berlin, and Norwegian. 
20 Fifth freedom rights allow the airline to carry revenue passengers between foreign countries as part of the service 
to/from its own country (e.g., under the fifth freedom right Air India is allowed to carry London-New York 
passengers on the respective segment of its New Delhi–London–New York service). 
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We also need to account for the two major mergers between the U.S. carriers, which occurred 
during the time period covered by our data, and directly relate to the joint ventures. Delta and 
Northwest merged in 2008, and in 2010 United merged with Continental Airlines. Following the 
consolidation events the airlines retained the Delta and United brands. However, due to the time 
it takes for the airlines to officially merge their operating certificates, the Northwest and 
Continental flights continued showing up in the data for at least a year after the merger has been 
approved. We have therefore re-coded Northwest observations after October 2008 as Delta Air 
Lines’ services. Similarly, all Continental Airlines’ flights after September 2010 have been 
recoded as United Airlines’ services. The two dates correspond to approval of respective mergers 
by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Aiming at studying the effects of antitrust immunity and joint ventures, we have followed our 
previous work (Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013)) and created the following independent 
variables, corresponding to the be types of airline services, defined according to both the airline’s 
membership in an alliance enjoying antitrust immunity, and the endpoints’ status as a hub in one 
or the other airline’s network. Referring to Figure 2 below, airports S1, H1, and H2 are assumed 
to be located across the Atlantic Ocean from H3, H4, and S2. The partnership between the 
airlines operating hubs H1 and H3 is called alliance 1, while alliance 2 consists of the airlines 
operating hubs H2 and H4.  
 
Figure 2: Simple network with two alliances 
Source: Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) 
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Given this set-up, we can differentiate between the following types of international markets: 
- Immunized alliance members’ services between their respective hub airports (H1-H3 and 
H2-H4 routes; e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to Detroit, or Delta Air Lines and Air 
France flights between Paris and Atlanta); we will call those “Alliance services between 
immunized hubs”. In the specifications we will estimate, this category will be denoted via 
the indicator variable ܫு௨௕ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬. 
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to a hub airport of a 
competing alliance with antitrust immunity (H1-H4 and H2-H3 routes; e.g., KLM service 
from Amsterdam to Chicago O’Hare, or Delta Air Lines services from this carrier’s hub 
to Frankfurt); to be denoted “Alliance services between competitors’ hubs”. The 
corresponding notation is ܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ . 
- Immunized alliance members’ services from their hub airports to airports which do not 
serve as hubs for any immunized alliance member (S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1 and S2-H2 
routes; e.g., KLM service from Amsterdam to Boston, or Lufthansa flights from 
Frankfurt to such airports as Phoenix, Boston, or Seattle); we will refer to those as “Other 
immunized alliance services”, and denote the corresponding indicator variable ܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬. 
- Services to immunized alliance members’ hub airports by airlines which are themselves 
not immunized alliance members (H3-X route; e.g., British Airways services to airports 
such as Chicago O’Hare or Denver before British Airways obtained immunity, or 
Continental Airlines or U.S. Airways' services to the respective EU hubs, such as Paris, 
Amsterdam, or Frankfurt). This category will be called “Other services to alliance hubs”. 
The notation we will use is ܫ்௢ூ௠௠௨௡௘ு௨௕ே௢ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ . 
Altogether, the above-defined four categories of markets represent all possible direct services 
to/from the hub airports of members of airline alliances with antitrust immunity. The baseline 
category will include all the services (by all the airlines) outside of the hub airports of the 
alliance members with immunity – i.e., services elsewhere on the network. We will ultimately 
disentangle the effects of joint ventures from antitrust immunity by using the interaction dummy 
variables involving the JV indicator variable we introduced previously and the airline-route-
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specific dummies above. Interestingly, the four categories above cover all the services involving 
the transatlantic joint venture partners. Services that involve antitrust immunity but not covered 
by a joint venture include all the immune services before the JV was granted (remember that our 
data starts from 2007, and the last JV was approved in 2010), as well as the services by 
immunized alliance partners not covered by the JV grant (i.e., the non-core alliance members, 
such as Finnair, Alitalia, Czech Airlines, or LOT Polish Airlines). 
Hub airports have been designated based on the structure of the airlines’ networks. EU airlines’ 
hubs mostly correspond to the respective countries’ capitals (except for Lufthansa, which 
operates hubs at both Frankfurt and Munich airports; Alitalia, using both Rome Fuimicino and 
Milan Malpensa as hubs21; and SAS, operating hubs at Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo). For 
the U.S. airlines participating in airline partnerships with antitrust immunity, we have designated 
the following airports as hubs: 
- American Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Ft. Worth, Miami 
- United Airlines: Chicago O’Hare, Denver, San Francisco, Washington Dulles 
- Northwest Airlines: Detroit, Minneapolis, Memphis. 
- Delta Air Lines: Atlanta, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City, New York JFK 
- Continental Airlines: Newark and Houston. 
Following the Delta-Northwest and United-Continental mergers, we designated Northwest and 
Continental hub airports as Delta and United hubs, respectively. 
The key dependent variables we will be using are the number of passengers, seats, flight 
frequency, and the load factor. All the observations represent monthly airline-route level totals 
(for the first three variables) or averages (for the load factor). Of the four measures, load factor is 
the closest measure of efficiency we can obtain from publicly available data. 
Additionally, our specifications will include an airport-market-level passenger-based Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, geometric average real GDP per capita for the US metropolitan area and the 
corresponding EU country, and the trade volume between the U.S. and the respective European 
country. Table 1 below includes the conventional descriptive statistics for our key variables. 
                                                            
21  In 2008, Alitalia opted for a single-hub strategy, gradually moving all its transatlantic services into Rome. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
Frequency 75.42 47.15 30 532 
Passengers 15,556 11,486 477 135,149 
Seats 19,108 13,824 992  157,922 
Load factor 0.8093 0.0987 0.1197 0.9877 
Control variables 
HHI 0.7410 0.2668 0.2509 1 
Trade volume (annual, million US$) 78,438 44,580 1,692 161,706 
Average real GDP per capita, EUR, 
2010 prices 34,235 4,464 15,144 51,009 
Key variables 
Joint venture 0.5059 0.4999 0 1 
Route classification dummies 
Between immunized hubs 0.2222 0.4157 0 1 
Other immunized alliance services 0.2671 0.3674 0 1 
Between competitors' hubs 0.2141 0.4102 0 1 
Other services to immunized hubs 0.1608 0.3674 0 1 
 
Table 1 shows that on average a service on the transatlantic market involves an airline flying a 
bit more often than twice per day using a smaller sized wide-body aircraft (the average aircraft 
size in our sample is about 250 seats, roughly corresponding to the capacity of a Boeing 767 in 
the usual two-class configuration). About half of the observations we have correspond to the 
services by the partner airlines covered by the joint venture.  
Table 2 demonstrates that over the years covered by our data about half of all the passengers 
have been carried on the joint venture services. However, we can also see that by 2013 the share 
of passengers carried by joint venture flights on the transatlantic market has exceeded 75 percent, 
increasing in jumps as the three JVs have been approved in 2008 to 2010.  
Table 2: Total passenger volumes depending on alliance relationships 
Year No Immunity Immunity without JV JV All 
2007 20,664,339 26,349,654 --- 47,013,993 
2008 20,735,955 18,526,190 8,636,166 47,898,311 
2009 18,110,593 9,099,327 17,642,297 44,852,217 
2010 11,731,344 3,925,622 29,688,732 45,345,698 
2011 7,293,634 2,908,733 37,108,899 47,311,266 
2012 7,486,906 3,010,547 36,810,313 47,307,766 
2013 7,956,158 3,278,286 37,223,818 48,458,262 
2007-2013 93,978,929 67,098,359 167,110,225 328,187,513 
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As first rough look at the effects of antitrust immunity and joint ventures on efficiency, Table 3 
presents descriptive statistics on the average load factors for services covered by the joint 
ventures, immunity without joint ventures, as well as the flights not covered by the antitrust 
immunity. Considering passenger load factor as a measure of productive efficiency, we see from 
this Table that initially JVs have led to higher load factors as compared to routes that were 
covered by antitrust immunity, but not included into the joint ventures. These benefits appear to 
have dissipated over time, and in 2013 the average load factor on the few remaining routes 
covered by antitrust immunity (but not included into JVs) is virtually the same as that on many 
markets covered by the transatlantic joint ventures. Our empirical analysis in the following 
section will account for market and airline heterogeneity, and include conventional control 
variables.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for load factor depending on alliance relationships 
Year  No Immunity Immunity without JV JV All 
2007 Mean 0.7633 0.8180 --- 0.7850 St.Dev 0.1503 0.0859 --- 0.1314 
2008 Mean 0.7511 0.7999 0.8081 0.7734 
St.Dev 0.1492 0.0957 0.0981 0.1316 
2009 Mean 0.7606 0.7768 0.8203 0.7836 
St.Dev 0.1469 0.1362 0.1113 0.1366 
2010 
Mean 0.7951 0.8052 0.8258 0.8128 
St.Dev 0.1395 0.1047 0.0880 0.1119 
2011 Mean 0.7923 0.7907 0.8057 0.8008 St.Dev 0.1466 0.1278 0.1051 0.1202 
2012 Mean 0.7908 0.8317 0.8261 0.8162 St.Dev 0.1491 0.0942 0.0997 0.1171 
2013 Mean 0.7916 0.8360 0.8375 0.8232 
St.Dev 0.1476 0.0976 0.0930 0.1149 
2007-2013 
Mean 0.7720 0.8068 0.8221 0.7982 
St.Dev 0.1485 0.1031 0.0995 0.1254 
4.2 Methodological approach 
Our methodological approach largely follows Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), with 
adjustments precipitated by the establishment of transatlantic joint ventures. The goal of the data 
analysis is to evaluate whether JVs have changed the respective airlines’ competitive strategies 
as well as (productive) efficiency in comparison to the services with antitrust immunity but not 
covered by the joint ventures. When performing the data analysis, it is important to keep in mind 
the structure of the partner airlines’ joint networks, as changes in the network flows might reflect 
changes in the market players’ competitive strategies, and ultimately consumer welfare. For 
16 
 
instance, the JV partners might prioritize services between their hub airports over offering more 
flights elsewhere in their joint networks (e.g., SkyTeam partners might add flights between 
Atlanta and Paris instead of offering a non-stop Atlanta-Berlin flight, channeling the traffic on 
the latter market via Paris, depriving the customers of the non-stop flight option). 
Our estimation techniques of choice are airline-market fixed effects. The hub-and-spoke network 
structure operated by the major players on the transatlantic market implies, among other things, 
that flight frequency decisions, especially on spoke-hub routes, are not driven by spoke-hub 
demand, but by demand on various spoke-spoke markets, going through the hub. To deal with 
this problem, we follow Bilotkach (2011), as well as Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), and 
estimate an airline-airport-pair-market fixed-effects model. Additionally, we also follow 
Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) in treating market concentration as potentially endogenous. 
We deal with this issue by instrumenting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the market-level 
passenger volume, lagged six months. 
To address the potential autocorrelation issue, we estimate a dynamic panel data model where 
the lagged dependent variable is introduced as a right-hand side regressor. Yet, dynamic panel 
data models can result in biased coefficient estimates due to the obvious endogeneity in the 
lagged dependent variable. In order to address this endogeneity threat, we will employ the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data. Specifically, we will 
use the system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) which built on and improved 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. System GMM analysis is specifically designed to 
address endogeneity issues with dynamic panel data models (i.e., biases in the coefficient 
estimate for the lagged dependent variable). We determined that the dynamic panel data GMM 
technique we employ produces valid estimates when the first four lags of dependent variable are 
included on the right-hand side, and all further lags are used to construct the instruments. 
Our data analysis will be based on the following specifications: 
log൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ ൌ ܺߚ ൅ ߙଵܫு௨௕ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߙଶܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߙଷܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߙସܫ்௢ூ௠௠௨௡௘ு௨௕ே௢ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ 
and 
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log൫ ௜ܻ௝൯ ൌ ܺߚ ൅ ܫ௃௏൫ߛଵܫு௨௕ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߛଶܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ு௨௕ே௢ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߛଷܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߛସܫ்௢ூ௠௠௨௡௘ு௨௕ே௢ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൯
൅ ܫே௢௃௏ூ௠௠௨௡௘൫ߜଵܫு௨௕ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߜଶܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ு௨௕ே௢ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߜଷܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൅ ߜସܫ்௢ூ௠௠௨௡௘ு௨௕ே௢ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ൯
൅ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ 
Where: 
 Yij is flight frequency, number of seats, passengers, or load factor of airline i on market j; 
 X is the vector of control variables, as discussed in the previous section of the paper; 
 Indicator variables ܫு௨௕ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬; ܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ு௨௕ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬ ; ܫு௨௕ை௧௛௘௥ூ௠௠௨௡௜௧௬; and I୘୭୍୫୫୳୬ୣୌ୳ୠ୒୭୍୫୫୳୬୧୲୷  represent the four 
key categories of services, also defined above; 
 ܫ௃௏ and ܫே௢௃௏ூ௠௠௨௡௘ are the indicator variables for services of the joint venture partners, as well 
as the services of immunized alliance members not covered by joint ventures, respectively. 
These two specifications will be implemented using the airline-market fixed effects model, as 
discussed earlier in this section. The dynamic panel data GMM specifications will also include 
lagged dependent variables. The former specification is essentially similar to the main model 
used by Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013). We however include fewer control variables, due to 
both data availability and lack of within-variation in some of the variables included into our 
previous work22. The latter specification modifies the former one by postulating different effects 
depending on whether or not the partner airlines operating under antitrust immunity are also 
members of a transatlantic (revenue-sharing) joint venture. 
The focus of our data analysis exercise is twofold. First, by simply applying the data analysis 
conducted in Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), we will be able to check whether the 
relationships discovered in that study are also present under the new institutional structure on the 
transatlantic market. Second, we aim at examining whether joint venture partners develop their 
network differently from the partner airlines that enjoy antitrust immunity, but are not part of the 
joint ventures. 
As a reminder, Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) found that antitrust immunity leads to the 
partner airlines increasing traffic between their hubs, and also from their hubs to non-hub 
airports. Results for the effect of antitrust immunity on traffic to the hub airports of the airlines 
                                                            
22  For instance, no new Open Skies Agreements have been signed over the time period covered by our data, and no 
new countries have joined the Visa Waiver Program. 
18 
 
that participate in competing alliances with immunity varied across sub-samples. Notably, that 
study discovered that antitrust immunity led to reduction in passenger traffic by the airlines, 
which were not themselves members of immunized partnerships, to the hub airports of carriers 
covered by immunity. This result was interpreted as being consistent with market foreclosure. 
As for the analysis of differences between services included into and not covered by the 
transatlantic joint ventures, our focus will be on the differences between ߛ௜ and ߜ௜ coefficients. 
The null hypotheses will naturally be that the joint ventures have not had any effect on the 
partners’ competitive strategies or productive efficiency (as proxied by the load factor), that is 
ߛ௜ ൌ ߜ௜; 	݅ ൌ 1,4തതതത. If JV is indeed the closest arrangement to the full-scale merger, possible under 
the current regulatory and institutional framework on the transatlantic market, we can expect the 
partner airlines to increase traffic on the routes between their hub airports, facilitating interline 
connections. Bilotkach et al. (2013), examining network reorganization following the Delta-
Northwest merger, concluded that the two airlines have re-organized their network to prioritize 
their largest hubs. An interesting question then is whether any increase in traffic between the 
joint venture partners’ hubs will be at the expense of the rest of the network. 
Last but not least, our analysis has to take into account an important difference between the three 
major alliances. Specifically, as discussed in Section 3.1 above, while both SkyTeam and Star 
alliances have been cooperating under antitrust immunity arrangements for a good number of 
years before approval of their respective joint venture application, this is not the case for the 
oneworld alliance. Until approval of the JV involving key oneworld alliance partners in July 
2010, the only working antitrust arrangement within this alliance covered American Airlines and 
Finnair services 23 . Thus, the American Airlines-British Airways-Iberia partnership status 
changed from codeshare without immunity straight to joint venture (skipping the intermediate 
‘immunity without the joint venture’ state). We can therefore suspect approval of the joint 
venture for the AA-BA partnership might not have led to the same sort of network restructuring 
and changes in partner airlines relationships as for the JVs covering SkyTeam and Star alliances.  
We decided to approach this issue by treating American-British-Iberia services following 
approval of their joint venture as services covered by antitrust immunity but excluded from the 
                                                            
23  Interestingly, the American – Finnair partnership was not covered by the JV rights granted to oneworld partners. 
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joint venture. Here is what we hope to accomplish by doing this: if approval of oneworld joint 
venture has indeed led the partner airlines to restructure their network in the same way as done 
by SkyTeam and Star alliances, the reclassification of oneworld services will diminish the 
magnitude of any JV-specific effects. Otherwise, the JV effects will become more pronounced, 
suggesting that it does take time for the partner firms to establish close relationships, and the way 
the alliance ends up working does not necessarily depend on the freedoms the partners obtain 
from the public authority.  
4.3 Empirical results and discussion 
Results of our data analysis are presented in Tables 4 to 9. Specifically, Table 4 reports the 
outcomes of specifications, similar to those employed in Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013). 
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimates of the effects of joint ventures in the airline-market fixed 
effects model context. The dynamic panel data GMM results are included in Tables 7 and 8. 
Tables 5-8 include results for both the entire sample, as well as for the sub-sample of what we 
call “stable” services, or airline-market combinations, which appear in our dataset for at least 50 
months. We have in this exercise assumed that services changing their operating carrier 
following a merger (e.g., Continental Airlines’ services operated by United after these two 
carriers merged) or as a result of a joint venture (e.g., services reassigned to a partner airline 
under the “metal neutrality” arrangements) were continuation of the previously operated routes 
rather than the new services. In this way, we aspire to reduce the possibility of seasonal and/or 
discontinued services affecting our results.  
Finally, Table 9 reports the fixed effects model results for the alternative treatment of oneworld 
alliance services. As a reminder, we have decided to recode flights by this alliance partners 
following approval of the respective JV as those covered by antitrust immunity, but not by joint 
venture arrangements. Such treatment is precipitated by the fact that, unlike SkyTeam and Star 
alliance partners, oneworld partners have had very limited experience operating under antitrust 
immunity prior to obtaining JV rights. 
Table 4, when compared to the results reported by Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), reveals a 
number of substantial changes on the transatlantic market in the age of joint ventures. 
Specifically, our previous research has demonstrated that granting of antitrust immunity has led 
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to the partner airlines increasing service frequency and passenger volumes on all the routes 
within their network (with the possible exception of routes between the competing alliance 
members’ hubs, where no robust relationship has been established). We also showed that airlines 
excluded from alliances have reduced their passenger numbers and flight frequency to hub 
airports of the alliance members – we interpreted this evidence as being consistent with market 
foreclosure. 
Our data analysis this time demonstrates that antitrust immunity leads to lower frequency, seats, 
and passenger traffic, as compared to the baseline category, with one notable exception: partner 
airlines with immunity (recall that in Table 4 we do not make distinction between immunized 
services within and outside of JVs) increase traffic on routes between their hub airports. The 
magnitude of this effect is however smaller than what we have reported in our previous paper. 
For instance, Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013) indicated that gaining antitrust immunity leads to 
about 20 percent higher passenger volumes on routes between the partner airlines’ hubs. 
According to Table 4, the magnitude of this effect is now only 7.1-7.7 percent.  
We do however find that services operated by partner airlines with antitrust immunity are 
characterized by higher load factors (an indicator of increased productive efficiency). Compared 
to our previous work, the magnitude of this effect has declined substantially for services between 
partner airlines’ hub airports (from nearly 10 percent to less than 2 percent), and increased 
somewhat for other services by the immunized carriers. Last but not least, we now observe no 
evidence consistent with market foreclosure. This could be the sign of either a market in 
equilibrium (with, for instance, immunized alliance members occupying the role of the dominant 
firm, and outside of alliance airlines being established fringe), or immunized carriers being more 
accommodating of the services of outside of alliance airlines. Also, most of the within-variation 
in this variable over the time period covered by our study comes from services to and from 
London Heathrow airport. Services into this airport do not generally require beyond-gateway 
traffic (i.e., passengers continuing their journeys beyond London) to be sustainable. However, 
this issue is outside of the scope of this paper.  
Looking at our main results – those relating to the changes specific to joint ventures – we can say 
the following. First, the fixed effects and dynamic panel data GMM estimates are nearly the 
same qualitatively (with the exception of the effect of JVs on passenger volumes on routes 
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between the alliance partner hubs). Quantitatively, dynamic panel data GMM suggests smaller 
differences between joint ventures and services covered by the antitrust immunity, but excluded 
from JVs. Also, treating oneworld joint venture services as those not covered by the joint 
ventures does not change the results qualitatively, but in most cases points to modest increases in 
the effect of JVs. 
The main takeaway message from our analysis is that the only clear and robust effect of joint 
ventures as compared to the immunized services that are not part of the JVs is the increase in 
capacity between the respective partner airlines’ hub airports. Moreover, this increase appears to 
happen at the expense of services elsewhere within the respective networks. Specifically, our 
results indicate that joint ventures lead to an increase in the number of seat capacity on routes 
between hub airports of the respective partner airlines (by 3-5 percent, depending on the 
estimation methodology). There is however no robust evidence to conclude that JV partners 
actually increase flight frequency or passenger volumes on the same routes, as compared to the 
situation before approval of transatlantic joint ventures. We do see robust evidence of lower 
traffic on routes between hub airports of competing JV hubs (such as, for instance, Atlanta-
Frankfurt or London-San Francisco markets). Compared to other immunized services, joint 
venture partners offer 3-5 percent fewer seats, 1.5-5 percent fewer flights, and carry 1.5-11 
percent fewer passengers24 on those routes. Also, joint venture partners carry 2.5-5 percent fewer 
passengers, and offer 1.6-4.3 percent fewer seats and 1-4.3 percent fewer flights on routes from 
their hubs to other airports (e.g., Amsterdam-Los Angeles, Frankfurt-Philadelphia, or Newark-
Edinburgh markets).  
Investigation of the effect of joint ventures on flight load factors shows the following: load 
factors on flights covered by the antitrust immunity tend to be higher than in the baseline 
category, indicating that immunity does allow the partner carriers to better fill up their flights. 
However, at the same time, we also find that joint ventures lead to the partner airlines reducing 
their load factors throughout the joint network by 0.5-5 percent. It is thus clear that JVs do not 
appear to yield (productive) efficiency benefits in this dimension. Although admittedly 
                                                            
24  The lower estimates of the effect of JVs on passenger volumes come from dynamic panel data GMM models, 
while fixed effects models suggest much higher effects. 
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speculative, a possible explanation for the observed effect would be an increase in market power 
of the respective alliances (suggesting price increases for transatlantic flights).  
5 Conclusion 
In the last two decades, the three (currently remaining) airline alliances – Star, SkyTeam and 
oneworld – were not only successful in extending the size of their networks by attracting new 
members, but also received approvals by public authorities to successively intensify their 
cooperation. What started in the 1990s as small and rather simple code-sharing agreements 
between pairs of carriers later was extended to (already far-reaching) joint price-setting and 
scheduling agreements (demanding the grating of antitrust immunity by the responsible public 
authorities) and – most recently – the founding of revenue-sharing joint ventures that aim at 
mimicking full-fledged mergers to the largest degree possible under the existing regulatory 
constraints. In approving the respective extensions of the alliances, the responsible public 
authorities aimed at balancing competition and cooperation in a way that the difference between 
public cooperation benefits and possible costs in the form of reductions in competition is 
maximized.  
As the merger-like revenue-sharing joint ventures of the core members of SkyTeam, Star and 
oneworld were approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation in 2008, 2009 and 2010, 
respectively, a sufficient amount of time has now passed to empirically study their impact on 
both the respective airlines’ competitive strategies as well as productive efficiency. Using U.S. 
DOT T100 International Segment data and applying airline-market fixed effects models, we find 
that joint ventures – compared to services with a lower degree of cooperation – lead to an 
increase in capacity between the respective partner airlines’ hub airports by 3-5 percent; however, 
this appears to occur at the expense of services elsewhere in the network. Productive efficiency, 
as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower for joint venture services, as 
compared to services operated under antitrust immunity only.  
Although our empirical analysis is unable to isolate significant (incremental) benefits of revenue-
sharing joint ventures, far-reaching conclusions such as the termination of such joint ventures – 
or even the end of airline cooperation under antitrust immunity – should be handled with great 
care. First, our empirical results show a higher efficiency (as measured by load factors) for 
flights under antitrust immunity compared to simple code-sharing flights, suggesting measurable 
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benefits of higher degrees of airline cooperation. Second, it is important to remark that our 
analysis is limited to several quantity and efficiency-related measures, leaving the potential price 
and (cost) efficiency effects of different degrees of airline cooperation outside the scope of the 
study. However, such analyses appear to be compulsory before definite conclusions on the 
welfare effects of especially revenue-sharing joint ventures can be drawn.  
Third, although several years have gone by since the formation of merger-like airline joint 
ventures, it appears likely that the respective partner airlines continue to optimize their respective 
networks possibly leading to additional consumer benefits in the future. Last but not least, our 
study only provides limited insights into the workability of competition between the three 
remaining alliances in transatlantic markets. Although limited in scope (due to, e.g., the 
dominance of particular alliances at particular hubs), the respective pressures created by inter-
alliance competition might be strong enough to sufficiently discipline the pricing behavior of 
airline alliances thereby increasing consumer welfare. 
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Table 4: Fixed effects results without joint venture variables 
 Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) Log(Load Factor) Log(Frequency) All All All All 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0332** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0016 
(0.0079) 
0.0315** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0349** 
(0.0074) 
Between competing 
hubs 
-0.0816** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0536** 
(0.0120) 
0.0279** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0407** 
(0.0107) 
Between own hubs 
0.0589** 
(0.0114) 
0.0763** 
(0.0121) 
0.0174** 
(0.0058) 
0.0255** 
(0.0104) 
Other to immune hub 
-2.3E-05 
(0.0095) 
0.0078 
(0.0095) 
0.0079 
(0.0070) 
0.0055 
(0.0077) 
Log(HHI) 
-0.1224** 
(0.0441) 
-0.1633** 
(0.0484) 
-0.0039 
(0.0222) 
-0.0531 
(0.0378) 
Log(Trade) -0.0457* (0.0250) 
0.0272 
(0.0262) 
0.0730** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0176 
(0.0221) 
Log(Average GDP per 
capita) 
0.1559* 
(0.0858) 
-0.2763** 
(0.0899) 
-0.4323** 
(0.0395) 
-0.0957 
(0.0719) 
Observations 16946 16946 16946 16946 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8991 0.9017 0.5978 0.8727 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 0.5389 0.6262 1.0178 0.4291 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
3. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 5: Main results – Seats and passengers, fixed effects 
 Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) All Stable All Stable 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0437** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0477** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0189** 
(0.0084) 
-0.0230** 
(0.0087) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0844** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0988** 
(0.0128) 
-0.0715** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0912** 
(0.0132) 
Between own hubs 
0.0647** 
(0.0117) 
0.0650** 
(0.0126) 
0.0701** 
(0.0125) 
0.0650** 
(0.0135) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0057 
(0.0108) 
-0.0099 
(0.0114) 
0.0282** 
(0.0112) 
0.0242** 
(0.0118) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0487** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0548** 
(0.0145) 
0.0124 
(0.0138) 
-0.0090 
(0.0147) 
Between own hubs 
0.0312** 
(0.0142) 
0.0280* 
(0.0150) 
0.0731** 
(0.0156) 
0.0656** 
(0.0164) 
Other to immune hub 0.0007 (0.0096) 
-0.0034 
(0.0098) 
0.0019 
(0.0097) 
-0.0064 
(0.0098) 
Log(HHI) -0.1238** (0.0440) 
-0.1460** 
(0.0452) 
-0.1682** 
(0.0483) 
-0.1656** 
(0.0493) 
Log(Trade) -0.0542** (0.0250) 
-0.0939** 
(0.0280) 
0.0108 
(0.0262) 
-0.0295 
(0.0295) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 0.1506** (0.0871) 
0.1548** 
(0.0952) 
-0.2037** 
(0.0910) 
-0.2440** 
(0.0991) 
Observations 16946 13714 16946 13714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8993 0.8831 0.9021 0.8864 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.5490 0.5128 0.6289 0.5795 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
3. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 6: Main results – Frequency and load factor, fixed effects 
 Log(Load Factor) Log(Frequency) All Stable All Stable 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0248** 
(0.0039) 
0.0248** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0417** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0465** 
(0.0081) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0129** 
(0.0062) 
0.0075 
(0.0065) 
-0.0454** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0596** 
(0.0117) 
Between own hubs 
0.0053 
(0.0059) 
-6.6E-05 
(0.0062) 
0.0245** 
(0.0107) 
0.0217* 
(0.0117) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0340** 
(0.0054) 
0.0341** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0215** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0107) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0612** 
(0.0086) 
0.0457** 
(0.0086) 
-0.0198* 
(0.0114) 
-0.0292** 
(0.0120) 
Between own hubs 
0.0419** 
(0.0069) 
0.0332** 
(0.0072) 
0.0248** 
(0.0131) 
0.0169 
(0.0139) 
Other to immune hub 0.0011 (0.0069) 
-0.0030 
(0.0070) 
0.0038 
(0.0079) 
-0.0007 
(0.0081) 
Log(HHI) -0.0443** (0.0221) 
-0.0205 
(0.0208) 
-0.0544 
(0.0378) 
-0.0596 
(0.0389) 
Log(Trade) 0.0650** (0.0104) 
0.0644** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0231 
(0.0222) 
-0.0545** 
(0.0251) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) -0.3543** (0.0393) 
-0.3988** 
(0.0431) 
-0.0734 
(0.0729) 
-0.1144 
(0.0795) 
Observations 16946 13714 16946 13714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6014 0.5798 0.8727 0.8680 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.0267 1.0003 0.5838 0.5438 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
3. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
 
  
30 
 
Table 7: Main results – Seats and passengers, dynamic panel data GMM 
 Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) All Stable All Stable 
Lagged dependent, first lag 0.3494** (0.0009) 
0.4752** 
(0.0011) 
0.3685** 
(0.0012) 
0.4821** 
(0.0044) 
Lagged dependent, second lag 0.0126** (0.0007) 
0.0385** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0006) 
0.0110** 
(0.0032) 
Lagged dependent, third lag 0.0239** (0.0003) 
0.0046** 
(0.0006) 
0.0237** 
(0.0005) 
0.0103** 
(0.0034) 
Lagged dependent, fourth lag -0.0284** (0.0004) 
-0.0834** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0228** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0842** 
(0.0028) 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0163** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0272** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0102** 
(0.0052) 
0.0324 
(0.0330) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0334** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0488** 
(0.0092) 
-0.0412** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0159 
(0.0376) 
Between own hubs 
0.0539** 
(0.0094) 
0.0412** 
(0.0079) 
0.0484** 
(0.0062) 
0.1063** 
(0.0450) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0102 
(0.0083) 
-0.0090 
(0.0063) 
0.0150** 
(0.0067) 
0.0592* 
(0.0368) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0186 
(0.0152) 
-0.0299** 
(0.0107) 
0.0162** 
(0.0084) 
0.0313 
(0.0381) 
Between own hubs 
0.0082 
(0.0171) 
0.0118 
(0.0088) 
0.0416** 
(0.0112) 
0.1055** 
(0.0386) 
Other to immune hub 0.0120** (0.0053) 
0.0031 
(0.0051) 
0.0018 
(0.0054) 
0.0075 
(0.0200) 
Log(HHI) -0.0082 (0.0079) 
-0.0192 
(0.0122) 
0.0123** 
(0.0050) 
0.0415 
(0.0461) 
Log(Trade) -0.0463 (0.0350) 
-0.0743 
(0.0580) 
-0.0138 
(0.0222) 
-0.0471 
(0.0595) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 0.1323** (0.0612) 
0.1067 
(0.0821) 
-0.1832** 
(0.0894) 
-0.0901 
(0.0843) 
Observations 16591 13509 16591 13509 
Hansen J-Statistic 
(p-value) 
486 
(0.4474) 
205 
(0.5652) 
367 
(0.7130) 
218 
(0.3204) 
Notes:  
1. Model employed – dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects 
and lagged market level passenger volume used as instrument for HHI.  
2. Year and month fixed effects included in all regressions, but not reported.  
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors reported in parentheses.  
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 8: Main results – Frequency and load factor, dynamic panel data GMM 
 Log(Load Factor) Log(Frequency) All Stable All Stable 
Lagged dependent, first lag 0.4049** (0.0010) 
0.4448** 
(0.0017) 
0.3091** 
(0.0002) 
0.4288** 
(0.0043) 
Lagged dependent, second lag 0.0266** (0.0016) 
0.0174** 
(0.0020) 
0.0085** 
(0.0001) 
0.0380** 
(0.0009) 
Lagged dependent, third lag 0.0116** (0.0008) 
-0.0031** 
(0.0012) 
0.0187** 
(0.0001) 
0.0027** 
(0.0009) 
Lagged dependent, fourth lag -0.0211** (0.0008) 
0.0034** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0337** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0862** 
(0.0012) 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0094** 
(0.0023) 
0.0106** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0170 
(0.0383) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0013 
(0.0019) 
0.0041* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0290** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0304 
(0.0402) 
Between own hubs 
-0.0035 
(0.0036) 
-0.0001 
(0.0036) 
0.0195** 
(0.0010) 
0.0145 
(0.0448) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
0.0154** 
(0.0025) 
0.0162** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0198** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0036 
(0.0402) 
Between competing hubs 
0.0362** 
(0.0027) 
0.0356** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0155** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0129 
(0.0265) 
Between own hubs 
0.0268** 
(0.0037) 
0.0247** 
(0.0034) 
0.0178** 
(0.0024) 
0.0151 
(0.0439) 
Other to immune hub -0.0036** (0.0008) 
-0.0018 
(0.0014) 
0.0056** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0041 
(0.0124) 
Log(HHI) 0.0124** (0.0023) 
0.0116** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
0.0040 
(0.0124) 
Log(Trade) 0.0354** (0.0178) 
0.0337** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0184 
(0.0124) 
-0.0419 
(0.0236) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) -0.2312** (0.0512) 
-0.2116** 
(0.0675) 
-0.0564 
(0.0734) 
-0.0532 
(0.0633) 
Observations 16591 13509 16591 13509 
Hansen J-Statistic 
(p-value) 
364 
(0.7260) 
379 
(0.8091) 
371 
(0.6737) 
285 
(0.2538) 
Notes:  
1. Model employed – dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects 
and lagged market level passenger volume used as instrument for HHI.  
2. Year and month fixed effects included in all regressions, but not reported.  
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors reported in parentheses.  
4. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
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Table 9: Results with reassigned oneworld services, fixed effects 
 Log(Seats) Log(Passengers) Log(Frequency) Log(Load Factor) 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0738** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0512** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0704** 
(0.0082) 
0.0226** 
(0.0044) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.1200** 
(0.0136) 
-0.1180** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0765** 
(0.0127) 
0.0019 
(0.0065) 
Between own hubs 
0.0824** 
(0.0130) 
0.0781** 
(0.0139) 
0.0232** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0042 
(0.0066) 
Immunity w/o 
JV interaction 
with 
From Immune Hubs to 
Other Airports 
-0.0196** 
(0.0087) 
0.0059 
(0.0089) 
-0.0256** 
(0.0082) 
0.0256** 
(0.0045) 
Between competing hubs 
-0.0569** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0136 
(0.0119) 
-0.0216** 
(0.0099) 
0.0433** 
(0.0074) 
Between own hubs 
0.0445** 
(0.0119) 
0.0609** 
(0.0128) 
0.0188* 
(0.0109) 
0.0161** 
(0.0059) 
Other to immune hub -0.0019 (0.0095) 
0.0030 
(0.0095) 
0.0023 
(0.0078) 
-0.0049 
(0.0069) 
Log(HHI) -0.1091** (0.0437) 
-0.1458** 
(0.0480) 
-0.0429 
(0.0377) 
-0.0367 
(0.0221) 
Log(Trade) -0.0485 (0.0251) 
0.0235 
(0.0264) 
-0.0184 
(0.0222) 
0.0720** 
(0.0104) 
Log(Average GDP per capita) 0.1464** (0.0881) 
-0.2329** 
(0.0919) 
-0.0612 
(0.0732) 
-0.3794** 
(0.0398) 
Observations 16946 16946 16946 16946 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8997 0.9026 0.8731 0.6020 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.5510 0.6322 0.5857 1.0287 
Notes: 
1. Methodology used – airline-market fixed effects model. HHI is instrumented by six month lagged market 
passenger volume. 
2. Compared to the results reported in Tables 5-8, JV variable here excludes oneworld services covered by the 
respective joint venture. Such services are instead included into the Immunity without JV variable. 
3. Heteroscedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses 
4. Year and month dummies included in all regressions, but not reported 
5. Significance: ** - 5%; * - 10% 
 
